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Interest of Amici Curiae
The Ethics Bureau at Yale 1 is a clinic at
Yale Law School composed of fourteen law students
supervised by an experienced practicing lawyer,
lecturer, and ethics professor. The Bureau has
drafted amicus briefs in matters involving lawyer
ethics and judicial conduct, assisted defense counsel
with ineffective assistance of counsel claims
implicating issues of professional responsibility, and
provided assistance, counsel, and guidance on a pro
bono basis to not-for-profit legal service providers,
courts, and law schools.
Additional amici curiae are the Louis Stein
Center for Law and Ethics, as well as lawyers and
scholars whose interests include the conduct of the
judiciary and the codes that regulate judicial
conduct. Because of the large number of amici, the
names and brief descriptions of these individuals are
attached as an appendix.
Because the impartiality of the judicial
process, a fundamental element of judicial ethics,
has been placed at issue by the pending matter,
amici believe they might assist the Court in
resolving the important issues presented.

The views expressed herein are not necessarily those of Yale
University or Yale Law School. Pursuant to Rule 37.3 of the
Rules of this Court, Petitioner and Respondent have consented
to the filing of this brief. This brief was not written in whole or
in part by counsel for any party, and no person or entity other
than amici have made a monetary contribution to the
preparation and submission of this brief.
1
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Summary of Argument
In our system of justice, judges possess and
exercise tremendous power. With that power comes
the obligation to maintain high standards of
professional responsibility. Preserving fair and
impartial courts is so fundamental that it is a
constitutional guarantee under the Due Process
Clause. In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136 (1955)
(“A fair trial in a fair tribunal is a basic requirement
of due process.”). At times “the probability of actual
bias on the part of the judge . . . is too high to be
constitutionally tolerable.” Caperton v. A.T. Massey
Coal Co., 556 U.S. 868, 872 (2009) (quoting Withrow
v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 47 (1975)). This case presents
one of those circumstances.
To give definition to this constitutional
requirement, the Model Code of Judicial Conduct
(“the Code”) promulgated by the American Bar
Association (“ABA”) was adopted, in relevant part,
by forty-nine of the fifty state supreme courts as
enforceable rules governing the conduct of each
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state’s judges. 2 In writing the Code, the ABA
recognized that the American judicial system is
premised upon the “principle that an independent,
impartial and competent judiciary . . . will interpret
and apply the law that governs our society.” Model
Code of Judicial Conduct pmbl. (2011). Most
importantly, the Code does not suggest mere
aspirational guidelines, but instead establishes
strict, enforceable standards for the ethical conduct
of judges and judicial candidates. Id. As such, the
Code requires judges to make competent decisions in
an impartial manner, untainted by personal bias or
prejudice.
2 Forty-nine of fifty states adopted the 2000 Model Code of
Judicial Conduct. Leslie W. Abramson, Appearance of
Impropriety: Deciding When a Judge’s Impartiality “Might
Reasonably Be Questioned,” 14 Geo. J. Legal Ethics 55, 55
(2000). Thereafter, thirty-two states adopted the 2007 revision
of the Code, while fifteen others have established committees to
do so. State Adoption of Revised Model Code of Judicial
Conduct, Am. B. Ass’n (Nov. 2, 2015), http://www.americanbar.
org/groups/professional_responsibility/resources/judicial_ethics
_regulation/map.html. Because the 2007 revision did not
change the relevant Code provisions at issue in this case—the
standards for impropriety, appearance of impropriety, and
disqualification—these provisions have been adopted by fortynine states, regardless of whether some of these states have
adopted the 2007 revision in full. See Mark I. Harrison, The
2007 ABA Model Code of Judicial Conduct: Blueprint for a
Generation of Judges, 28 Just. Sys. J. 257 (2007).

Pennsylvania has adopted the 2007 Model Code of
Judicial Conduct, which is referenced in this brief. In fact,
Chief Justice Castille was a member of the Court that adopted
and amended the Code of Judicial Conduct in both 2005 and
2014. See Pa. Code of Judical Conduct Canons 1-4 (2014); see
also Pa. Const. art. 5, § 10(c) (“[T]he Supreme Court shall have
the power to prescribe rules governing . . . the conduct of all
courts.”).
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Judges who wear “two hats” in the same case
violate the requirement of judicial impartiality.
Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 404 (1989).
It is particularly egregious when a sitting judge
continues to wear a prosecutor’s hat. See Gay v.
United States, 411 U.S. 974, 975 (1973) (Douglas, J.,
dissenting) (“[It is a] basic concept of due process of
law that a person should not serve as both
prosecutor and judge.”). In blatant violation of these
principles, then-Chief Justice of the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court Ronald Castille refused to recuse
himself despite having sought the death penalty in
Mr. Terrance Williams’ prosecution while serving as
District Attorney of Philadelphia. Wearing a
prosecutor’s hat that was impossible to remove
because of his personal stake and role as a lawyer
in Mr. Williams’ case, Chief Justice Castille
impermissibly sat on the bench when his Court
reversed Mr. Williams’ successful petition for postconviction relief.
As tempting as it might be, it is a per se
violation of the Code for a prosecutor (or any lawyer,
for that matter), having secured victory in the trial
court and on direct appeal, to then sit as a judge on
the court that adjudicates a challenge to that victory.
In the view of amici, violations of the Code of this
magnitude are clear evidence of a Due Process
violation. Because there can be no dispute that the
Code violations here are among the gravest found in
the Code, Chief Justice Castille’s conduct deeply
undermined the integrity of the judicial proceedings
and trampled any notion of Due Process for Mr.
Williams.
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Argument
I.

By serving as prosecutor and then judge
in the same case, Chief Justice Castille
created a serious risk of actual bias by
flouting his obligation to identify and
avoid a forbidden conflict.
A.

District
Attorney
Castille’s
personal
involvement
in
the
prosecution
of
Mr.
Williams
rendered him unable to later serve
as a judge in Mr. Williams’ case.

In order to decide their cases fairly and
independently, judges are required by both Due
Process and the Code to remain impartial and
independent. This standard reflects the fundamental
right, guaranteed by the Due Process Clause, to
present one’s case to an impartial tribunal.
Caperton, 556 U.S. at 876. Based on several prior
decisions, Caperton mandated an objective standard
to guarantee this right—“whether, ‘under a realistic
appraisal of psychological tendencies and human
weakness,’ the interest ‘poses such a risk of actual
bias or prejudgment that the practice must be
forbidden.’” Id. at 883-84 (quoting Withrow, 421 U.S.
at 47).
This essential right is clearly endangered
when a judge’s conscious or unconscious partiality
threatens to “infect both the process and outcome of
a trial.” Raymond McKoski, Disqualifying Judges
When Their Impartiality Might Reasonably Be
Questioned, 56 Ariz. L. Rev. 411, 432 (2014). Indeed,
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anything that might tempt a judge to forget the
burden of proof required to convict or lead the judge
“not to hold the balance nice, clear and true between
the State and the accused,” denies the accused the
Due Process of law. Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510,
532 (1927).
Chief Justice Castille had every reason to
understand these obligations under both the Due
Process Clause and the Code, but ignored them
when he sat on a tribunal that decided the appeal of
a case he began as District Attorney. A fundamental
tenet of our adversarial system is the purposeful
separation of the prosecutorial and judicial roles.
Marshall v. Jerrico, Inc., 446 U.S. 238 (1980) (“[T]he
strict requirements of neutrality cannot be the
same for . . . prosecutors as for judges, . . . whose
impartiality serves as the ultimate guarantee of a
fair and meaningful proceeding in our constitutional
regime.”); United States v. Jones, 997 F.2d 1475
(D.C. Cir. 1993) (“There is also a critical difference
between the prosecutor’s role as an advocate for the
government’s position and the judge’s role as an
impartial arbiter and protector of the defendant’s
rights.”).
The ideal judge should be neutral and openminded, serving as a detached arbiter rather than a
forceful advocate for one side in a case. Public
Utilities Comm’n v. Pollak, 343 U.S. 451, 466 (1952)
(explaining that a judge “must think dispassionately
and submerge private feeling on every aspect of a
case”); Model Code of Judicial Conduct R. 2.2 cmt. 1
(“To ensure impartiality and fairness to all parties, a
judge must be objective and open-minded.”). In
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contrast, a prosecutor is involved in a case as a
vigorous advocate for the government in an
adversarial process. It would thus be “difficult if not
impossible for such a judge to free himself from the
influence of what took place” in his previous role as a
prosecutor. In re Murchison, 349 U.S. at 138. As a
result, a prosecutor-turned-judge cannot be “wholly
disinterested in the conviction or acquittal of those
accused.” Id. at 137.
Psychological research on cognitive biases
explains why a prosecutor cannot later serve as a
neutral judge in the same case. When people are
rewarded for their success in persuading others of
the correctness of a position, they then become
psychologically committed to that position and
devote the majority of their mental effort to
justifying it. E.g., Philip E. Tetlock et al., Social and
Cognitive Strategies for Coping with Accountability:
Conformity, Complexity, and Bolstering, 57 J.
Personality & Soc. Psychol. 632, 633 (1989). This
confirmation bias effect, known as defensive
bolstering, makes people in such circumstances less
likely to acknowledge the weaknesses of their
positions and more likely to engage in selfjustification. Id.
Empirical studies have also found that these
inherent cognitive limitations make prosecutors
more likely to minimize evidence inconsistent with
their favored hypothesis—the defendant’s guilt—and
to construe ambiguous information in a way that
supports this hypothesis. Barbara O’Brien, A Recipe
for Bias: An Empirical Look at the Interplay Between
Institutional Incentives and Bounded Rationality in
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Prosecutorial Decision Making, 74 Mo. L. Rev. 999,
1027-32 (2009). A prosecutor publicly stakes out the
position that the defendant should be found guilty
when he files charges, and the verdict is the only
feedback he receives about the correctness of that
decision. Id. at 1022-23. Due to the nature of the
prosecutor’s ultimate task of publicly presenting an
effective case for the defendant’s guilt, a prosecutorturned-judge would thus have to overcome powerful
cognitive limitations to serve as a neutral, impartial
judge in the same case in which he previously
advocated, before the court and his community, for
the correctness of his assessment of the defendant’s
guilt. 3
Here, Chief Justice Castille’s personal
involvement in the prosecution of Mr. Williams
compels the conclusion that he was subject to these
cognitive limitations. As the District Attorney, he
personally authorized the decision to seek the death
penalty after he had already assessed the evidence
against Mr. Williams and publicly committed
himself to Mr. Williams’ guilt and to a death
This bias is likely exacerbated in the context of postconviction challenges. Scholars have identified institutional
and psychological reasons why prosecutors may be unduly
skeptical of such challenges; relevant factors include public
pressure not to look “soft on crime,” fear of offending police or
victims by appearing too defense-minded, and the prosecutor’s
own personal commitment to the conviction. E.g., Bennett L.
Gershman, The Prosecutor’s Duty to Truth, 13 Geo. J. Legal
Ethics 309 (2001); Judith A. Goldberg & David M. Siegel, The
Ethical Obligations of Prosecutors in Cases Involving
Postconviction Claims of Innocence, 38 Cal. W. L. Rev. 389
(2002); Daniel S. Medwed, The Zeal Deal: Prosecutorial
Resistance to Post-Conviction Innocence, 84 B.U. L. Rev. 125
(2004).
3
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sentence. Although he was not advocating before the
jury in his role as the District Attorney, he was
responsible for supervising the trial prosecutor who
was found to have violated her Brady obligations,
and he signed his name on the appellate brief his
office filed to defend the death sentence it had
obtained in Mr. Williams’ case. The psychological
effects of cognitive bias and defensive bolstering
apply perhaps even more powerfully to the District
Attorney, an elected public official who was the face
of his office’s decision to prosecute and seek the
death penalty against Mr. Williams.
Chief Justice Castille’s partiality was further
compounded because his task was to evaluate the
performance of his own law office and the lawyers he
supervised in prosecuting Mr. Williams. As District
Attorney, he was responsible for overseeing the
conduct of trial prosecutors in his office, including
their compliance with Brady obligations to disclose
exculpatory evidence. Cf. Pa. Rules of Prof’l Conduct
R. 5.1(a) (1987) (“A partner in the law firm, 4 and a
lawyer who individually or together with other
lawyers possesses comparable managerial authority
in a law firm, shall make reasonable efforts to
ensure that the firm has in effect measures giving
reasonable assurance that all lawyers in the firm
conform to the Rules of Professional Conduct.”).
“‘Firm’ or ‘law firm’ denotes a lawyer or lawyers in a law
partnership, professional corporation, sole proprietorship or
other association authorized to practice law; or lawyers
employed in a legal services organization or the legal
department of a corporation or other organization.” Pa. Rules of
Prof’l Conduct R. 1.0(c); see also Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct
R. 1.0(c).
4
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Given his professional investment in this case
and his public accountability to the position of the
State, the District Attorney could not be impartial
and neutral when subsequently reviewing the
conviction his office obtained. See In re Bulger, 710
F.3d 42, 49 (1st Cir. 2013) (explaining that a
reasonable person might question whether a judge
who bore supervisory responsibility for prosecutorial
activities during some of the time at issue could
remain impartial); United States v. Arnpriester, 37
F.3d 466, 467 (9th Cir. 1994) (holding that a judge
who had been the U.S. Attorney, and therefore
responsible for the entire office, should have recused
himself from deciding a case that was under
investigation during his tenure). Chief Justice
Castille’s decision to hear Mr. Williams’ case thus
flies in the face of his ethical obligations and the
requirements of Due Process for a judge to perform
all duties of judicial office “fairly and impartially,”
Model Code of Judicial Conduct R. 2.2, and to
remain “objective and open-minded,” id. cmt. 1.
B.

A fortiori, Chief Justice Castille’s
judicial involvement in this case
created
the
appearance
of
impropriety and partiality.

Judicial impartiality is not only crucial to
protecting litigants’ Due Process rights, but also in
maintaining public confidence in the justice system.
Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 407 (“The legitimacy of the
Judicial Branch ultimately depends on its reputation
for impartiality and nonpartisanship.”). Indeed, the
mere questioning of a court’s impartiality “threatens
the purity of the judicial process and its
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institutions.” Potashnick v. Port City Const. Co., 609
F.2d 1101, 1111 (5th Cir. 1980). As such,
maintaining the appearance of impartiality is as
important as impartiality itself. In re Murchison,
349 U.S. at 136 (“[J]ustice must satisfy the
appearance of justice.”). The test under the Code is
whether the conduct would create in “reasonable
minds” a perception that the judge engaged in
conduct that “reflects adversely on the judge’s
honesty, impartiality, temperament, or fitness to
serve as a judge.” Model Code of Judicial Conduct R.
1.2 cmt. 5. This rigorous standard is necessary
because the public cannot respect the legitimacy of
the courts if judges do not act as models of
independence, integrity, and impartiality. 5
As such, beyond the clear impropriety of Chief
Justice Castille’s judicial involvement in this case,
there is an appearance of impropriety so manifest as
to taint Mr. Williams’ subsequent post-conviction
proceedings before the Pennsylvania Supreme Court.
Specifically, when a judge goes from advocating for
one party to donning the black robe in the same case,
he not only acts without integrity, but also undercuts
the public’s perception of judicial neutrality.
The ABA urges judges to take considerable precautions when
they take the bench to ensure that the appearance of judicial
impartiality is maintained. For example, the ABA opined that
judges should not allow their former firms to retain their
names, see ABA Comm. on Prof’l Ethics and Grievances,
Formal Op. 143 (1935), should not receive a percentage of a
contingency fee for the work they did on a case while employed
at a firm, see ABA Comm. on Prof’l Ethics & Grievances,
Informal Op. C-676 (1963), and should not receive a fee for
referring a case to a firm, see ABA Comm. on Prof’l Ethics &
Grievances, Informal Op. 433 (1961).
5
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The appearance of impropriety will exist
anytime a prosecutor subsequently presides over his
case’s appeal. The impropriety is amplified in this
case because of the lower court finding that Mr.
Williams sought to defend on appeal—namely,
whether the trial prosecutor, who was supervised by
District Attorney Castille, improperly withheld
exculpatory evidence. As a result, the government’s
appeal required Chief Justice Castille to adjudicate
the propriety of the conduct of an attorney under his
own leadership and supervision as District Attorney.
No reasonable person could conclude that Chief
Justice Castille could impartially evaluate the
performance of his own colleague, acting under his
leadership, because that evaluation would require—
both implicitly and explicitly—a judgment of his own
leadership and supervision. Given Chief Justice
Castille’s clear personal interest in this case, it is
difficult to conceive of facts that might cast a greater
probability of bias or appearance of impropriety.
II.

Chief Justice Castille had an affirmative
obligation to recuse himself because his
former involvement as a prosecutor in
Mr. Williams’ case rendered him partial.

A judge is required to disqualify himself “in
any proceeding in which the judge’s impartiality
might reasonably be questioned.” Model Code of
Judicial Conduct R. 2.11(A). Under both the Code
and Due Process, the standard in determining
whether a judge is required to recuse himself is
objective, focusing not on whether the judge is
actually biased, but on whether the judge’s
impartiality might be reasonably questioned.
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Caperton, 556 U.S. at 872 (noting that the Court has
required recusal, where as an objective matter, “the
probability of actual bias on the part of the judge . . .
is too high to be constitutionally tolerable.” (internal
citations omitted)); Model Code of Judicial Conduct
R. 2.11(A).
Because his prior involvement in the case as a
prosecutor rendered him partial, Chief Justice
Castille was obligated to disqualify himself from this
case. The Code identifies this precise circumstance
as requiring disqualification when Rule 2.11
mandates that a judge recuse himself if he “served
as a lawyer in the matter in controversy, or was
associated with a lawyer in the matter in
controversy.” Model Code of Judicial Conduct R.
2.11(A)(6)(a). Thus, even if Chief Justice Castille had
not played any role in Mr. Williams’ prosecution, he
would still be barred from hearing this case because
of his association with the lawyers who did. Rule
2.11 further mandates that a judge who “served in
governmental employment, and in such capacity
participated personally or substantially as a lawyer
or public official concerning the proceeding” also
recuse himself. Id at R. 2.11(A)(6)(b). Any one of
these circumstances obligates a judge to disqualify
himself, and Chief Justice Castille’s prior
involvement as District Attorney satisfies all three.
Moreover, the Code stipulates that judges
cannot sit in review of their own decisions, Model
Code of Judicial Conduct R. 2.11(A)(6)(d), and prior
involvement as a judge on a case necessarily
disqualifies them from making future rulings that
could be tainted by their prior knowledge, see In re
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Murchison, 349 U.S. at 139 (finding a Due Process
violation when a judge presided at the contempt
hearing of a witness after serving as the “one-man
grand jury” out of which the contempt charges
arose). It would be anomalous to prohibit a judge
from reviewing his or her previous decision while
allowing a judge to hear a case that he was
personally involved in prosecuting, as Chief Justice
Castille did in Mr. Williams’ case.
Additionally, due to his personal involvement
in Mr. Williams’ case at the trial level and on direct
appeal, Chief Justice Castille likely had access and
was privy to information uncovered during the
District Attorney’s Office’s investigation, including
information outside the bounds of what was
discoverable and introduced at trial. Judges should
not rely upon, or even consider, information received
outside the official record because “the reliability of
that information may not be tested through the
adversary process.” United States v. Craven, 239
F.3d 91, 103 (1st Cir. 2001). Accordingly, judges are
obligated to disqualify themselves in cases where
they have “personal knowledge of facts that are in
dispute in the proceeding.” Model Code of Judicial
Conduct R. 2.11(A)(1).
Extrajudicial knowledge is proper grounds for
recusal because this type of special insight into the
facts of a case, without more, may prevent a judge
from impartially weighing the parties’ evidence and
arguments. In re Murchison, 349 U.S. at 136-39
(1955) (holding that a judge who held one-man grand
jury proceedings could not subsequently preside over
the contempt hearing of a witness in that grand jury
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because the judge could not free himself from the
influence of personal knowledge of what occurred in
the grand jury session); Craven, 239 F.3d at 103
(disqualifying a sentencing judge who based his
sentence on an improper ex parte communication
with a court-appointed expert). It would be “difficult,
if not impossible, for a judge, no matter how sincere,
to purge that information from her mind.” Id.
Here, of course, Chief Justice Castille’s access
to information went well beyond an ex parte
communication.
The attempts to defend Chief Justice Castille’s
role in signing the death penalty authorization
actually provide a compelling demonstration of the
impropriety that required Chief Justice Castille to
recuse himself. This Court has been told that Chief
Justice Castille’s approval for his subordinates to
seek the death penalty was an “administrative
formality.” Resp’t Opp’n Br. to the Pet. for Cert. 11
n.6. Let us hope not. The decision to seek the death
penalty must be one of the most profound acts a
prosecutor can reach. Without this “administrative”
act by the District Attorney himself, Mr. Williams
would not be fighting for his life. Moreover, Chief
Justice Castille himself did not believe such actions
were routine or trivial when he emphasized the
number of executions he sought as District Attorney,
as an important component of his political campaign
for Chief Justice.
Furthermore,
Chief
Justice
Castille’s
authorization to seek capital punishment has been
defended because it did not reflect some form of
personal
animosity
toward
the
defendant.
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Appellant’s Answer to the Mot. to Recuse, Joint
Appendix [“J.A.”] at 175a. But this characterization
misses the point—personal animosity has nothing to
do with the recusal standards at issue in this case. It
is more than sufficient that at one time Chief Justice
Castille was head of the District Attorney’s Office in
Philadelphia, that he personally authorized the
seeking of the death penalty, and that the conduct of
the District Attorney’s Office under his tenure was
the issue when the appeal from the grant of habeas
relief came before the Court. These factors alone are
more than sufficient to disable him from sitting on
the Court that heard that appeal.
Disqualification is a critical prescription for
maintaining impartiality. Rule 1.12(a) of the
Pennsylvania Rules of Professional Conduct requires
a judge moving from the bench to private practice
“not [to] represent anyone in connection with a
matter in which the lawyer participated personally
and substantially as a judge.” Pa. Rules Prof’l R.
1.12(a), And when a government lawyer moves to
private practice, the lawyer is disqualified from
representing a private client in a matter in which he
or she had responsibility as a public official. Id. R.
1.11(a)(2) (explaining that a former government
lawyer “shall not otherwise represent a private client
in connection with a matter in which the lawyer
participated personally and substantially as a public
officer or employee”); see General Motors Corp. v.
City of New York, 501 F.2d 639, 650-52 (2d Cir.
1974). The same public policy that informs the
disqualification of a former government lawyer from
representing a private client in the same matter for
which he had official responsibility should disqualify
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him from sitting as judge in the same matter.
Arnpriester, 37 F.3d at 467-68.
Thus, Chief Justice Castille’s decision not to
recuse himself was an affront to the bedrock
principle of an impartial judiciary. The Code does
not merely list best practices, but instead demands
that judges act in a manner that maintains the
public trust in the judiciary. See Caperton, 556 U.S.
at 889 (explaining that the Model Code and state
codes of judicial conduct “serve to maintain the
integrity of the judiciary and the rule of law”). The
Code not only establishes ethical obligations that are
binding on judges, but also embodies how judges
across the country define and understand judicial
impartiality. In adopting the Code’s provisions
concerning disqualifications, supreme court judges
nationwide have agreed that transitioning from
prosecutor to judge in the same case is improper and
incompatible with judicial impartiality.
Chief Justice Castille had a clear ethical
conflict in this case and therefore an obligation to
recuse himself in the matter. His failure to do so did
not just create an invidious harm to Mr. Williams,
but also placed an indelible stain on the legitimacy of
the judicial system of Pennsylvania.
III.

Chief Justice Castille’s partiality and
impropriety cannot be “cured” by a
multimember panel.

While this Court has never decided whether a
multimember panel can “cure” a conflicted judge’s
participation in any proceeding, let alone one with
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such high-stakes, the proper answer must be “no.”
The nature of the multimember panel compounds
the insidious nature of such impropriety for four
main reasons. First, when a single conflicted judge is
allowed to participate in deliberations, he or she
taints the entire panel’s impartiality with explicit or
implicit advocacy for one side. Accordingly, the
conflicted judge’s participation in the panel
effectively multiplies the impermissible biases and
ethical violations.
A panel of judges is not intended to be, and is
not in fact, a collection of individuals screened off
from communication with one another, each in his
or her own silo. Instead, multimember panels
handle appeals in a manner that maximizes the
benefits of different perspectives, backgrounds, and
experiences. See, e.g., Daniel J. Meador, Appellate
Case Management and Decisional Processes, 61 Va.
L. Rev. 255, 281 (1975). It is thus both the
expectation and the reality that the panel of judges
will participate together in oral arguments and
conferences, engage in dialogue designed to persuade
their fellow judges of their respective views, and
circulate written opinions in the hopes of convincing
others to sign on to a particular position. See, e.g.,
A.B.A. Comm’n on Standards of Judicial Admin.,
Standards Relating to Appellate Courts § 3.01 cmt.,
at 9 (1977) (“The basic concept of an appeal is that
it submits the questions involved to collective
judicial judgment.”). In short, the very essence
of the multimember tribunal creates countless
opportunities for a biased judge to infect his
colleagues’ perspectives by advocating for his
impermissible bias during each stage of deliberation.
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The potential for a multimember panel to be
tainted by the partiality of a single biased judge is
not merely a common sense conclusion, but a
proposition supported by extensive psychological
literature on group susceptibility to post-deliberation
attitudinal shifts. The impact of one member’s bias
on group decisionmaking can enhance that bias’
effect. The phenomenon of group polarization occurs
“when an initial tendency of individual group
members toward a given direction is enhanced
following group discussion.” Cass R. Sunstein,
Deliberative Trouble? Why Groups Go to Extremes,
110 Yale L.J. 71, 85 (2000). As a result, “groups often
make more extreme decisions than would the typical
or average individual.” Id. “Group polarization is
among the most robust patterns found in
deliberating bodies,” id., and multiple studies have
replicated the phenomenon in various contexts, see,
e.g., Daniel J. Isenberg, Group Polarization: A
Critical Review and Meta-Analysis, 50 J. Personality
& Soc. Psychol. 1141 (1986). Furthermore, there is
growing evidence from studies on multimember
judicial panels that judges are far from immune from
this polarization. Sunstein, supra, at 103-04 (citing
Frank B. Cross & Emerson H. Tiller, Judicial
Partisanship and Obedience to Legal Doctrine:
Whistleblowing on the Federal Courts of Appeals, 107
Yale L.J. 2155 (1998); and Richard L. Revesz,
Environmental Regulation, Ideology, and the D.C.
Circuit, 83 Va. L. Rev. 1717 (1997)).
Given this phenomenon, it is clear that
deliberation does not always produce the golden
mean of all its members’ attitudes in a way that can
cancel out bias. Instead, allowing the entry of bias
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multiplies the risk that the panel will make a more
extreme decision in the direction of that bias.
Second, when the conflicted judge’s potential
interests in a proceeding are readily apparent, it is
extremely difficult for others on the panel to freely
criticize one side without apprehension that to do so
will tarnish their relationship with their colleague.
In this case, the conduct of the District Attorney’s
Office under Chief Justice Castille’s tenure was the
central issue on appeal to the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court. Any reasonable observer would conclude that
all of the Justices were conflicted because each
must have considered, either consciously or
subconsciously, how criticizing the District
Attorney’s Office in their conferences or the
circulation of draft opinions would affect their
rapport with a colleague with whom they deal every
day. Given each judge’s duty to decide cases
impartially and objectively, based solely on the
merits of the arguments introduced by each side,
such considerations are clearly impermissible.
Again, these concerns are not simply common
sense assumptions, but are propositions backed by
an extensive psychological literature on motivated or
self-interested reasoning. See, e.g., Ziva Kunda, The
Case for Motivated Reasoning, 108 Psychol. Bull.
480, 483 (1990) (“[People] search memory for those
beliefs and rules that could support their desired
conclusion. They may also creatively combine
accessed knowledge to construct new beliefs that
could logically support the desired conclusion. . . .
The objectivity of this justification construction
process is illusory because people do not realize that
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the process is biased by their goals. . . . (emphasis
added)). Furthermore, unlike the U.S. Supreme
Court Justices, judges in other appeals courts often
exhibit dissent aversion partly because “the costs in
impaired collegiality from frequent dissenting” may
outweigh the benefits. See Lee Epstein, William M.
Landes & Richard A. Posner, Why (And When)
Judges Dissent: A Theoretical and Empirical
Analysis, 3 J. Legal Analysis 101, 135 (2011).
Third, Chief Justice Castille’s role as the Chief
Justice placed him in a prime position to exert his
influence through both his administrative power and
seniority. Specifically, the Pennsylvania Code states
that “the president judge of a court shall . . . [b]e the
executive and administrative head of the court,
supervise the judicial business of the court,
promulgate all administrative rules and regulations,
make all judicial assignments, and assign and
reassign among the personnel of the court available
chambers and other physical facilities.” Pa. Cons.
Stat. § 325(e)(1). Unlike most judicial decisions,
which occur in open court and must be explained by
reasons that are available to public scrutiny, the
Chief Justice’s exercise of administrative duties in
large part occurs behind closed doors and is thus less
constrained by the obligations of accountability and
is shielded from public scrutiny. Cf. Judith Resnik &
Lane Dilg, Responding to a Democratic Deficit:
Limiting the Powers and the Term of the Chief
Justice of the United States, 154 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1575,
1632 (2006) (describing how the Chief Justice’s
administrative decisions in the U.S. Supreme Court
are shielded from the public view).
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The additional authority vested in the Chief
Justice may serve as an extraneous consideration,
either consciously or subconsciously, for the other
Justices on the panel. As an initial matter, the
Justices may be concerned that ruining their rapport
with the Chief Justice will negatively affect many of
the day-to-day aspects of their work, including the
opinion writing assignments they receive, their
chamber space, and their physical facilities. Beyond
just the potential for inconvenience and annoyance,
however, the Chief Justice’s administrative powers
may serve as an additional tool for him or her to
exert influence over the rest of the Court. See Frank
B. Cross & Stefanie Lindquist, The Decisional
Significance of the Chief Justice, 154 U. Pa. L. Rev.
1665, 1667-68 (2006); see also Tracey E. George &
Albert H. Yoon, Chief Judges: The Limits of
Attitudinal Theory and Possible Paradox of
Managerial Judging, 61 Vand. L. Rev. 1, 2-4 (2008)
(describing a case in which a Chief Judge
strategically waited for two of his colleagues to take
senior status before circulating a petition, so that
they could not participate).
Indeed, the Chief Justice takes the lead in
structuring oral arguments and conferences. As
such, he or she may effectively frame the entire
proceeding in a manner that is advantageous to his
or her preferred position by speaking first, setting
the agenda, and strategically deciding when a vote
will be taken. Cf. Cross & Lindquist, supra, at 166869; see also Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, The
Framing of Decisions and the Psychology of Choice,
211 Sci. 453, 453 (1981) (discussing how the same
option may become more attractive or persuasive if it
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is framed in way that is less threatening to its
audience). Chief Justice Rehnquist himself explained
that “what the conference shapes up like is pretty
much what the [C]hief [J]ustice makes it.” David M.
O’Brien, Storm Center: The Supreme Court in
American Politics 200 (6th ed. 2003).
Even if the administrative powers of the Chief
Justice have no immediate impact, “the very title of
‘Chief Justice’ may provide an amorphous source
of leadership authority. . . . so that a Chief Justice
generally has an initial psychological advantage over
the other Justices in a struggle for influence within
the Court.” Cross & Lindquist, supra, at 1673-74
(emphasis added) (internal quotation marks
omitted). Psychological research has demonstrated
that individuals often voluntarily defer to authority
figures, sometimes even to the detriment of others or
themselves.
This basic concept is entrenched in the fields
of both social and organizational psychology, and it
has been studied extensively for decades. See, e.g.,
Robert B. Cialdini & Noah J. Goldstein, Social
Influence: Compliance and Conformity 55 Ann. Rev.
Psychol. 591, 596 (2004) (“Most organizations would
cease to operate efficiently if deference to authority
were not one of the prevailing norms. Yet, the norm
is so well entrenched in organizational cultures that
orders are regularly carried out by subordinates with
little regard for potential deleterious ethical
consequences of such acts.” (emphasis added)); Tom
R. Tyler, The Psychology of Legitimacy: A Relational
Perspective to Voluntary Deference to Authorities, 1
Personality & Soc. Psychol. 323, 323 (1997) (“In fact,
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as the Milgram studies on obedience to authority
suggested, people often defer to authorities even
when the actions they must undertake to do so are
extremely personally aversive.”).
Fourth, it is instructive to review Chief
Justice Castille’s position that the role of the other
six Justices cured his ethical violations in light of the
ethical rules concerning lawyer conflicts of interest
adopted by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court. Like
almost every state supreme court, Pennsylvania has
adopted the full imputation principle enshrined in
Rule 1.10 of the Model Rules. Pa. Rules of Prof’l
Conduct R. 1.10. This provision mandates that all
lawyers in the same law firm are subject to each
other’s conflicts of interest, and all are equally
barred from taking on an engagement that creates a
conflict for any one lawyer in the firm. Id. It does not
matter whether the lawyer is three thousand miles
away, is in a different department of the firm, has
never met the lawyer with the actual conflict, or
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knows nothing about the matter or the client
creating the conflict. 6
The principles behind this rule contrast
sharply with Chief Justice Castille’s view that his
conflict was not imputed to his colleagues and,
moreover, that he was permitted to participate fully
in every aspect of the adjudication. While amici
applaud the steps the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
took to protect clients from lawyers with conflicts of
interest, it is the view of amici that, if anything, the
need to protect litigants from judges with conflicts of
interest is even more important. Consequently, if
Chief Justice Castille’s participation in this case is
left standing, it will be anything but the correct
result.
One could argue that many of the
aforementioned threats to impartiality would
persist, creating a biased panel, even if the Chief
Justice had recused himself. Even if the Chief
Justice were screened off from the case, he might
Equally instructive is the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s
adoption of a narrow cure for one specialized type of conflict of
interest that permits the lifting of imputation. Pennsylvania’s
conflict imputation rule stipulates that when a lawyer joins a
new law firm, the conflicts he or she brings to the new law firm
will not be imputed to others in the firm so long as the new
lawyer is immediately and fully screened from participation in
any matter in which he or she would be conflicted, and so long
as elaborate protocols are instantly instituted to assure that
the screen is not breached. Pa. Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 1.10.
Contrast that with Justice Castille’s opposing approach of
bringing his breach of Rule 2.11 to the Court’s adjudicative
process by ostentatiously taking a full seat at the oral
argument, the deliberation table, and the drafting and
production process of the opinion.

6
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still be able to exercise his administrative powers
and intangible influence on the panel in other ways.
Furthermore, the other Justices, knowing Chief
Justice Castille’s connection to the District
Attorney’s
Office,
might
still
harbor
some concern about criticizing the prosecutor’s
misconduct.
It would be inconceivable, however, to require
an entire court of last resort to recuse itself. Instead,
Justices may sit, even if conflicted, in situations
where their presence is absolutely necessary. See
United States v. Will, 449 U.S. 200, 213 (1980)
(reaffirming the “ancient” Rule of Necessity that a
judge must sit in a case, even if “he has [a] personal
interest” where the case could not be heard
otherwise) (emphasis added). This does not,
however, excuse the behavior of Chief Justice
Castille or affect the remedy in this case because the
Chief Justice’s presence was simply not necessary.
The Code may have to tolerate some conflicts, but it
does not tolerate impropriety that can easily be
avoided. Furthermore, because Chief Justice Castille
is now retired, and new Justices have joined the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court, there will be no such
problem on remand.
For the foregoing reasons, a multimember
tribunal cannot cure the profound conflicts of one
member. Instead, it provides an incubator for one
member to spread impermissible and unethical
biases, either through implicit or explicit advocacy
within the deliberation process or through the
creation of an environment where colleagues are
affected by considerations extraneous to the
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objective merits of the case. Furthermore, Chief
Justice Castille’s actual and symbolic authority as
Chief Justice further intensify his potential to taint
the entire panel because of the power and influence
he may possess within the Court. As such, it is clear
that Chief Justice Castille’s participation in this case
eviscerated the very concept of impartiality. He
should not have been permitted to affect his
colleagues in a way that assaults the principle of
even-handed justice and violates the Due Process
rights guaranteed to every individual by the United
States Constitution.
Conclusion
Chief
Justice
Castille
had
both
a
constitutional and ethical obligation to recuse
himself in this case. His prior involvement as
District Attorney ensured that he was incapable of
providing the most basic Due Process right to a fair
tribunal to Mr. Williams. Moreover, his clear
disregard for numerous sections of the Code that
required his recusal left an indelible stain on the
Pennsylvania judicial system. To make matters
worse, Chief Judge Castille threatened the
impartiality of each and every one of his colleagues
on the Pennsylvania Supreme Court by hampering
their ability to decide the case based solely on an
impartial consideration of the evidence presented.
Such a blatant disregard of both constitutional
protections and ethical obligations simply cannot
be tolerated because of the damage it does
to individuals like Mr. Williams and to the
broader community’s need for confidence in the
independence, impartiality, and fairness of the
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judiciary. If Chief Justice Castille’s conduct is not
unconstitutional impropriety itself, amici do not
know what is.
Respectfully submitted,
Lawrence J. Fox
Counsel of Record
127 Wall Street
New Haven, Connecticut 06511
(203) 432-9358
lawrence.fox@yale.com
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Ethics2 is based at Fordham University School of
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their work. Over the past decade, the Stein Center
and affiliated Fordham Law School faculty
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School of Law at the University of Louisville. His
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and Mines Professor of Law at the University of
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Anne S. Emanuel is the Professor of Law
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Hulen Professor of Law at the University of
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on Ethics and Professional Responsibility and has

3a
served as an advisor for the Restatement (Third) of
the Law Governing Lawyers.
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extensively in the areas of judicial conduct and
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Bruce A. Green is the Louis Stein Professor
of Law at Fordham Law School, where he directs the
Louis Stein Center for Law and Ethics. He teaches
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Lawrence K. Hellman is the Dean Emeritus
and Professor of Law at Oklahoma City University
School of Law. He teaches and writes in the area of
legal ethics, and has served as Co-Chair of the
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Conduct Committee.
Donald K. Joseph is a Visiting Associate
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primary focus. Prior to teaching the law, he
practiced in the litigation department of a major
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Ethics: A Jurisprudential Analysis, 22 Notre Dame
J.L. Ethics & Pub. Pol’y 305 (2008).
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